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Summary of ChangesHello @alec-w, I'm Gemini Code Assist1! I'm currently reviewing this pull request and will post my feedback shortly. In the meantime, here's a summary to help you and other reviewers quickly get up to speed! This pull request enhances the SPIRE agent's flexibility by enabling the inclusion of custom Certificate Authorities (CAs) into its trust store. This is particularly useful for development environments or specific setups where self-signed certificates are used, ensuring the agent can establish trust with endpoints secured by these additional CAs. Highlights
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Code Review
This pull request introduces a feature to add extra CA certificates to the SPIRE agent's trust store, primarily for development environments with self-signed certificates. A medium-severity vulnerability was identified where the new extraCAs parameter could allow users with Helm value permissions to inject arbitrary CA certificates, potentially leading to Man-in-the-Middle attacks. To address this, it's recommended to reference a pre-existing Kubernetes secret instead of directly passing raw certificate content. Furthermore, for improved maintainability, consider adding a checksum annotation to the pod template to ensure that changes to the CAs trigger a rolling update of the agent pods.
Added in the same manner as done for the SPIRE server already. This allows configuring the agent to trust self-signed certificates for local dev.
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Part of https://github.com/cofide/cofide/issues/175
Same approach as already taken with the SPIRE server.
When running SPIRE agent in clusters outside the one with the SPIRE server we can point it at a URL to fetch the server trust bundle (our external storage). When running locally this is served with a self-signed cert and so the SPIRE agent needs to be configured to trust this.